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The Minnesota Supreme Court
1966-1967
The Minnesota Supreme Court Note surveys sig-
nificant decisions of the 1966-1967 term. The deci-
sions selected were thought to represent new develop-
ments in Minnesota law or otherwise to be of interest
to members of the Minnesota Bar. The results reached
by the court are analyzed and evaluated in terms of their
effect upon Minnesota law and are frequently compared
with the law of other jurisdictions. While the decisions
are discussed individually, they are arranged according
to the principal legal issue considered; this arrangement,
however, is merely one of convenience, since many of
the cases involve issues from several areas of the law.
Criminal Law: The Right to Coumsel
at Minnesota Lineups
Defendant, arrested on charges of theft by swindle,1 was
compelled to participate in a pretrial lineup which led to his
identification and conviction. The major issue raised on appeal
was whether defendant had a right to counsel 2 during the
lineup procedure. Defendant argued that Escobedo v. Illinois
3
insured the right to counsel when an attempt is made to elicit a
confession and that, since the purpose of the lineup is similar
to that of eliciting a confession-procurement of evidence to be
used against the defendant at trial-the right to counsel must be
granted.4 The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the
right to counsel could not be extended to police lineups. State v.
Garrity, 151 N.W. 2d 773 (Minn. 1967).
Historically, the sixth amendment was apparently intended
to make the right to counsel available only on request by the
1. M x-. STAT. § 609.52 (1965).
2. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. VI; MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
3. 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Court held that police refusal to
honor defendant's request to consult with his attorney during interroga-
tion procedures was a violation of the sixth amendment right to counsel,
and therefore the elicited confession was inadmissible.
4. Brief for Appellant at 18-19, State v. Garrity, 151 N.W.2d 773
(Minn. 1967).
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defendant, only in federal proceedings, and only in capital cases.5
However, the sixth amendment right to counsel has undergone
considerable change since its adoption through the application of
the right by the Supreme Court as a tool to protect against in-
fringement of other constitutional guarantees. Thus, where pro-
cedural due process or the privilege against self-incrimination
have been threatened," the presence of counsel has been required
to protect these rights.
The desire to protect procedural due process was the basis
for the first extension of the right to counsel. In 1932 the Su-
preme Court held that due process required the states to appoint
trial counsel in capital cases where the defendant was un-
able to adequately conduct his own defense, whether or not he
had requested counsel.7 The Court later found the denial of
counsel in a federal noncapital felony case to be a violation of
the sixth amendment.8 The Court refused to apply this extension
to the states9 until 1963 when, in Gideon v. Wainwright,0 it held
that the fourteenth amendment secured the right to counsel for
a defendant in a state noncapital felony case.
The idea that the presence of counsel is necessary to protect
against deprivation of due process also provided the basis for
attaching the right to counsel at a time prior to the trial, at the
"9critical stages" of the criminal proceedings. The purpose of
the right is to avoid the inherent dangers of certain pretrial pro-
cedures, thus its assertion does not depend upon a showing of
actual prejudice." State arraignment procedures have been
found to be critical, since it is at that stage of litigation that
valuable defenses must be raised or lost.'2  State preliminary
hearings have been held to be similarily critical, even though it is
5. See W. BEANY, THE RIGHT TO CoUNsEL IN AmEaicAx CoUnTS
32-33 (1955); F. HELLER, THE SIxTH A TENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE UNITED STATES 110-11 (1951); Holtzoff, The Right to Counsel Un-
der the Sixth Amendment, 20 N.Y.L.Q. 7-8 (1944).
6. Although the right to counsel has most often rested upon due
process and self-incrimination, it has been argued that police identifica-
tion procedures violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See Butler v. Crunlish, 299 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964),
where the court held that requiring a nonbailed suspect to appear in a
lineup while exempting a bailed suspect is a denial of equal protec-
tion. But see Rigney v. Hendrick, 355 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1965).
7. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
8. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463 (1938).
9. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
10. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).




not mandatory that a plea be made therein.13
The Court has also held that the presence of counsel is neces-
sary to the protection of the fifth amendment privilege against
self-incrimination,' 4 paralleling the development of the right of
counsel in the critical stages of criminal proceedings in the "co-
erced confession" cases.15 In these cases, the absence of counsel
was initially viewed by the Court as an indication of the presence
of coercion.' 6 However, in 1964 the Court shifted the emphasis,
finding the apparent presence of coercion sufficient to warrant a
holding that there had been a violation of the right to counsel."'
The Minnesota Supreme Court has reluctantly accepted the
basic premises of the United States Supreme Court's sixth
amendment decisions on right to pretrial counsel,'8 and, in spite
13. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (per curiam).
14. "No person shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself ... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. V; MNN. CONST.
art. 1, § 7.
15. Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); Crooker v. California,
357 U.S. 433 (1958); Cincenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958); Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
16. Cases cited note 15 supra. The early coerced confession cases
were not couched in terms of the fifth amendment. In federal cases,
the Court refused to reach the constitutional question, and instead
rendered coerced confessions inadmissible under the Court's author-
ity to supervise federal criminal procedures. McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332 (1943).
17. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). See Enker &
Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo
v. Illinois, 49 MIN.N. L. REV. 47, 57-58 (1964), for the view that the Court
incorrectly placed the emphasis upon -the sixth rather than the fifth
amendment. The right to counsel to protect fifth amendment rights
has been refined in recent cases. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Although the Court
did not expressly rest its right to counsel holding on the fifth amend-
ment in Escobedo, as it did in Miranda, it may be inferred that the fifth
amendment privilege provided impetus for the decision.
18. Other states have reacted similarly. Cf., e.g., State v. Richard-
son, 194 Kan. 471, 399 P.2d 799 (1965); Bean v. State, 81 Nev. 25, 398
P.2d 251 (1965). But cf. People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361,
42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965); State v. Neely, 239 Ore. 494, 398 P.2d 482
(1965). See also Rothblatt, Police Interrogation and the Right to Coun-
sel, Post Escobedo v. Illinois: Application v. Emasculation, 17 HAsTINGs
L.J. 41 (1965). Statistical data regarding the attitudes of law enforce-
ment officials, prosecutors, and judges toward the right to counsel may
be found in Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota:
Some Field Findings and Legal-Policy Observations, 48 MIN. L. REv.
1 (1963).
However, the Minnesota Supreme Court has recently extended the
right to counsel at trial to all misdemeanor actions where the court may




of Gideon v. Wainwright,"9 the Minnesota court has not followed
the spirit of the critical stage cases.20  In State v. Osgood,2 1 the
court stated that the right to counsel in a felony case does not
extend to representation in the investigative process following an
arrest or in the preliminary hearing required to ascertain whether
there is reasonable grounds for believing that the accused has
committed a crime.22 In State v. Perra,23 the court suggested that
the Supreme Court rulings that state arraignment procedures and
preliminary hearings were a critical stage of the criminal pro-
ceedings were limited to capital cases.24 In 1965, the Minnesota
court restricted the application of Escobedo by precluding an af-
firmative denial of a suspect's right to counsel, rather than im-
posing the duty to inform him of the right.2 5 The court has also
ruled Escobedo inapplicable to certain "investigative" stages, 26
19. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
20. See State ex rel. Lacklineo v. Tahash, 267 Minn. 237, 126 N.W.2d
646 (1964); State v. Osgood, 266 Minn. 315, 123 N.W.2d 593 (1963); State
v. Perra, 266 Minn. 545, 125 N.W.2d 44 (1963).
21. 266 Minn. 315, 123 N.W.2d 591 (1963).
22. Id. at 323, 123 N.W.2d at 598.
23. 266 Minn. 545, 125 N.W.2d 44 (1963).
24. Id. at 555, 125 N.W.2d at 51.
25. State ex rel. Rasmussen v. Tahash, 272 Minn. 539, 141 N.W.2d
3 (1965). This position was later shown to be clearly insufficient: "An
individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer.
While such a request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his
failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver." Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966). The Minnesota court, however, made
liberal use of the prospective application of Miranda permitted by
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). See State v. Carmichael,
275 Minn. 148, 145 N.W.2d 554 (1966); State ex rel. Fruhrman v.
Tahash, 275 Minn. 242, 146 N.W.2d 174 (1966); State ex rel. Ger-
berding v. Tahash, 275 Minn. 195, 146 N.W.2d 541 (1966), rev'd, 87
S. Ct. 1506 (1967). The reversal in the Gerberding case related to the
Minnesota court's contention that Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964),
which held that the determination of whether a confession was volun-
tary must be made by the court rather than the jury, was also to be
applied prospectively.
26. State v. Weber, 272 Minn. 243, 137 N.W.2d 527 (1965). After
being escorted to the sheriff's office, the defendant voluntarily confessed
to the beating of his stepson. The court ruled the confession admissible,
even though obtained while the defendant was in custody and without
counsel, on the grounds that the confession was given during the in-
vestigation of a possible criminal act. The court relied upon In re
Groban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957), which held that counsel could be excluded
from proceedings investigating the cause of a fire, a situation clearly
distinguishable since that decision rested upon the consideration that
the purpose of the fire marshall's hearing was not to adjudicate per-
sonal responsibility, but to formulate a policy of fire prevention. The
court also relied upon Long v. United States, 338 F.2d 549 (D.C. Cir.
1964); Latham v. Crouse, 338 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 1964); and Procter
v. United States, 338 F.2d 533 (D.C. Cir. 1964), in all of which the
19681
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and has distinguished "admissions" from confessions. 27
In the Garrity case the court focused on the self-incrimina-
tion aspect of the right to counsel issue. Defendant had argued
that the lineup was an infringment upon his privilege against
self-incrimination to the same extent as was the confession in
Escobedo, and that therefore, in the absence of counsel, the evi-
dence procured was similarily inadmissible. 2 In dismissing the
defendant's claim, the court noted that the absence of counsel
is constitutionally relevant only when it deprives the accused
of the right to silence or some other right which could have
been effectively asserted had counsel been present.2 9 Pursuing
this premise, the court then found that, unlike compulsion to
extort communications, compulsion to examine ordinary physical
evidence, as in a police lineup, does not violate the right to si-
lence.30 It was therefore concluded that since there was no
defendant had either been informed of his right to counsel, or had
blurted out the confession before there was an opportunity to do so.
27. State v. Johnson, 152 N.W.2d 529 (Mlinn. 1967).
28. Brief for Appellant at 18-19. The choice of a self-incrimina-
tion rather than a due process defense was somewhat unfortunate, not
because of the likelihood of success of the latter, but because of the
extreme tenuousness of the former.
29. State v. Garrity, 151 N.W.2d 77., 776 (Minn. 1967). The court
relied upon Kennedy v. United States, 353 F.2d 462 (D.C. Cir. 1965), and
Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), as establishing this prem-
ise. In Kennedy, defendant's contention that he had a right to counsel at
the time he was taken to the scene of the crime to be identified by a
victim was rejected on the grounds thai; there was simply nothing an
attorney could have done for him at that point, since the police had the
right to proceed. Similar reasoning was adopted by the Supreme
Court in Schmerber, where the defendant made the same argument
concerning the compulsory administration of a blood test.
30. This distinction was originally established in Holt v. United
States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910), and was further refined by Wigmore:
Unless some attempt is made to secure a communication-writ-
ten, oral or otherwise-upon which reliance is to be placed as
involving his consciousness of the facts and the operation of his
mind in expressing it, the demand made upon him is not a
testimonial one....
8 J. WIG O RE, EVIDENCE § 2265, at 386 (1961). A somewhat different test
has been espoused by others, although definitely in a minority. This
draws the line between passivity and activity: "Submission may be com-
pelled but not active cooperation." C. McCoRmicK, EVIDENCE § 126, at 265
(1956). Compare State v. King, 44 N.J. 346, 209 A.2d 110 (1965) and State
v. Ramirez, 76 N.M. 72, 412 P.2d 246 (1966), with State v. Taylor, 213
S.C. 330, 49 S.E.2d 289 (1948) and Beachem v. State, 144 Tex. Crim. 272,
162 S.W.2d 706 (1942). The Holt-Wigmore distinction has been ac-
cepted in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in the case of
fingerprints, palmprints, and bare footprints, whether given voluntarily
or not. See People v. Jones, 112 Cal. App. 68, 296 P. 317 (1931); State
v. Rogers, 233 N.C. 390, 64 S.E.2d 572 (1951); Owens v. Common-
wealth, 186 Va. 689, 43 S.E.2d 895 (194.7). See generally Annot., 28
[Vol. 52:698
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threat to the privilege against self-incrimination, there was no
violation of defendant's right to counsel.
Four days prior to the Garrity decision, the United States
Supreme Court decided United States v. Wade,31 in which it
ruled that the denial of counsel at a pretrial lineup was a depri-
vation of the sixth amendment right to counsel even though it
explicitly held that there was no violation of the fifth amend-
ment.32 There was no reference to a violation of due process.33
Instead, the inherent dangers of "suggestion," 34 the likelihood
that counsel for the defense would be handicapped at trial by
not having access to information regarding what occurred at the
lineup, and the potential impact of the identification upon the
outcome of the trial prompted the Court to find that the sixth
amendment right to counsel may be asserted without reference
to other constitutional rights. Recognizing that the critical stage
and coerced confession cases were aimed at guaranteeing a "fair
trial" and that the presence of counsel at lineups will protect
against derogation of that basic right, the Court established the
new rule35 that evidence relating to the identification of a sus-
A.L.R.2d 1136-40 (1953). The Supreme Court recently renewed its sup-
port of the Holt-Wigmore distinction in Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966) (compulsive extraction of blood to determine intoxica-
tion), and it has been directly held that police lineups do not violate
the privilege against self-incrimination. Caldwell v. United States, 338
F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1964).
31. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
32. Id. at 221-23.
33. Although the Court referred to the critical stage cases, and
cited Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), in support of the "fair
trial" aim of the sixth amendment, there was seemingly a concentrated
attempt to avoid the use of due process language. Moreover, in Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301-02 (1967), a companion case where the
Wade decision was held to be inapplicable because not retroactive, the
Court considered an independent claim of deprivation of due process,
and found none, even though the Wade decision cited the Stovall
identification procedure as an example of the "suggestive" influences
which place the suspect's rights in jeopardy, and therefore require the
protection of the presence of counsel. In view of this, it seems apparent
that the Wade decision could not have rested solely on due process.
34. The Court considered at length instances of police procedures
which have a conscious or subconscious "suggestive" effect upon the
witness' decision. In Wade, several witnesses saw the defendant in
the custody of an FBI agent prior to the lineup. In Gilbert v.
California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), another companion case, the lineup
was conducted in a large auditorium where one hundred witnesses made
wholesale identifications. In Stovall, the suspect was presented to
the witness alone and in handcuffs. See P. WALL, EYEwsTNESs DmEx-
TIFCATION nT CRIMWAL CASES 40-65 (1965), which was heavily relied
unon by the Court.
35. The Court clearly admitted that the rule was new by refusing
19681
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pect in a police lineup occuring after June 12, 1967, in the ab-
sence of counsel, will be inadmissible at trial, federal or state,30
unless it can be established that the courtroom identification had
an independent source,37 or can be considered harmless error.38
In the context of the traditional view that the sixth amend-
ment right to counsel must be asserted in the context of another
constitutional right, the Garrity court's refusal to extend the
right to make it applicable to lineup procedures is defensible.
Even if the defendant had argued in accordance with the cri-
tical stage cases,3 9 that there existed. an inherent threat to due
process that warranted the extension of right to counsel to police
lineups generally,40 it is unlikely that the Minnesota court would
find the police lineup stage to be "critical" when the Supreme
Court had not yet done so.41
Since the Wade rule is applicable only to lineups taking
place after June 12, 1967, it is not applicable to the Garrity
case. If it had been applicable, the Minnesota court, despite its
seeming reluctance to accept past Supreme Court right-to-coun-
sel holdings, probably would have been obligated to hold that
Garrity had been denied his right to counsel. While it is true
that Wade was placed in the lineup after indictment whereas with
to apply it retroactively in Stovall because it had not been foreshadowed
in previous cases and would seriously disrupt the administration of
the criminal law. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1967).
36. If the doctrine of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
left any doubt that the Wade decision would be directly applicable to
the states, the holding in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967),
reversing a state conviction, dispelled it.
37. The Court adopted the Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471 (1963), exclusionary test whereby the illegally obtained evidence is
inadmissible unless shown to be free from the "taint" of the illegality.
In Gilbert, however, it was held that evidence introduced by the state
regarding the lineup itself, rather than a courtroom identification that
might be effected by the prior lineup, was inadmissible per se. Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 272-73 (1967).
38. The test for determining harmless error was recently estab-
lished in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
39. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); Hamilton v. Alabama,
368 U.S. 52 (1961). See text accompanying notes 11-13 supra.
40. See Comment, The Right to Counsel During Police Identifica-
tion Procedures, 45 TEXAs L. REV. 504, 519-25 (1967), for this argument
in detail. For reported instances of error in identification procedures,
and the view that there is an inherent danger of such error, see E.
BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); J. FRANK & B. FRANK,
NOT GuILTY (1957); P. WALL, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION nf CRIMINAL
CASES (1965).
41. The Minnesota court has not shown a willingness to move in




Garrity it was prior to indictment,42 the refusal of the Supreme
Court to accept such a distinction in Escobedo and Miranda is
indicative of its likelihood of success.43 Pre-indictment proce-
dures may be more investigatorial in nature, but the inherent
dangers are the same whether the lineup is pre- or post-indict-
ment. Such an artificial distinction would merely enable the
police to circumvent the basic concepts of the Wade decision.
If the Wade holding that counsel be allowed at police lineups
proves undesirable, more tenable means of avoiding its effect
might rest with the Court's suggestion that the basis for regard-
ing the lineup as critical might be removed if Congress, the leg-
islatures, or the local police departments take steps to elimi-
nate the risks and impediments to a suspect's rights in the lineup
procedure.44 The Court did not elaborate upon how stringent
the regulation must be;4 5 however, since the Court appeared con-
cerned with the basic reliability of eyewitness identifications,
apart from the "suggestive" effect of police conduct,46 it can be
assumed that such regulation would have to be extensive.
Whether or not a state court, in a case such as Garrity, could
dilute the authority of Wade, it should, in light of the inherent
dangers involved in police lineups, follow the spirit of the Wade
decision. While it might be argued by some, including the Gar-
rity court, that constitutional safeguards may be achieved only
at the cost of police efficiency,47 in the case of lineups such effi-
42. In Garrity, the defendant contended that he had not even
been arrested, but had been taken into custody on a voluntary basis.
Brief for Appellant at 20. The court, however, assumed that he had
been arrested. This discrepancy probably rests upon a conflict in the
definition of the term. See Foote, The Fourth Amendment: Obstacle
or Necessity in the Law of Arrest, 51 J. Cmnvi. L.C. & P.S. 402, 403-05
(1960).
43. The time at which the right to counsel attaches in Escobedo,
as refined in Miranda, is the point at which the suspect is taken into
custody, or otherwise deprived of freedom of action to a substantial
degree. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
44. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 (1967).
45. The Court did refer to a "scientific method" formerly espoused
by Wigmore in J. WIGmoE, THE SCIENCE OF JUDIcIAL PROOF 541 (3d ed.
1937), which included the use of a library of pre-made films and re-
cordings to be shown along with that of the suspect. United States
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 239 n.30 (1967).
46. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 254 (1967) (dissenting
opinion).
47. Although this most definitely is an important consideration, it
is likely that it is often overemphasized. See Address by Yale Kamisar,
American Psychological Association, Philadelphia, Pa., August 31, 1963,
for statistics indicating that the confession cases did not overwhelm-
ingly affect enforcement efficiency.
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